Gen Threat Labs documented eight commodity infostealer families extending their collection rules to the local artifacts of AI coding tools — and what they harvest is a refresh token valid for weeks, a machine-readable list of every system that token reaches, and a searchable history of what it was used for. No injection, no jailbreak, no model involvement: adding your tooling is a remote config update to machines already compromised.
OpenAI shipped plugin automations on all plans on 29 September 2026 against MCP Events — a draft with no SEP number, in a repository whose README calls its contents exploratory. The draft gets the webhook hardening right and makes the two envelopes that report absence optional, so a revoked permission, a lost buffer and a genuinely quiet upstream all reach your agent as the same empty stream.
Tool counts decide nothing here. The axis that determines both whether a browser agent can do the job and how bad a hostile page gets is which session it holds — an isolated automation context, a dedicated profile quietly accumulating logins, or your own signed-in browser. Both browser vendors that shipped an MCP server this year deliberately kept your own session out of it, which is why neither does the agentic-shopping demo everyone expected.
Google blocked the thing everyone asked about: an agent connected through Home MCP cannot unlock your door. But four of the five tools are reads, and list_home_history hands a third-party agent a queryable record of motion, presence and door events over any window — with no equivalent gate, because nobody has written down what a sensitive read is. Actuation is bounded, legible and reversible. The read side is none of those.
Four MCP servers exist to stop a coding agent writing code against an API it half-remembers, and all four work. The axis that decides whether they help is what kind of text comes back: upstream files, snippets extracted from upstream, or prose a model wrote about the code. And none of them closes the failure they are sold against — your agent still does not know which version you run, because none of them reads your lockfile and one of them makes the version a sentence in the prompt.
WebMCP lets a page hand an AI agent a list of callable tools, and Chrome is shipping it behind a flag while the W3C community group draft is still moving. The part worth arguing about is not discovery but authority: a registered tool executes as your page's own JavaScript, inside the session the logged-in user already established, so your server sees a request it cannot distinguish from a click. You are publishing an API whose only credential belongs to someone who is not the caller.
On 4 September Docusign said its MCP server opens to every agent on 30 September — Claude, ChatGPT, Gemini, Copilot, Slack, any MCP client — governed by account-level admin controls. The law has allowed an automated agent to bind its principal since 1999, on one condition: the act must be attributable to that person. A per-account toggle attributes a class of acts, which is what carried deterministic scripts and is exactly what a model that negotiates strains. Closing that gap is the deployer’s job, and nothing in MCP does it for you.
These four are benchmarked on throughput, which is a 1.9 ms spread inside a 50–500 ms upstream call — and ranked on it while the axis with a date attached goes unmeasured. Three of the four implement the 2026-07-28 stateless revision and the most-used Go library does not, but the sharper question is which of them absorbs your dual-revision window instead of turning it into your topology.
The MCP specification settles the negative — as of revision 2026-07-28 a server MUST NOT pass through the token it received from its client — but leaves RFC 8693 token exchange on the roadmap, so four gateways answer the question four different ways. agentgateway and ContextForge exchange the token; Obot attaches the user’s stored upstream token and is mid-migration between the two; Docker MCP Gateway has no user concept at all, which is honest for a workstation and disqualifying for a fleet. Pick on that axis, and notice that Docker’s isolation story is the best of the four on an axis the others do not compete on.
On 20 August Google moved A2A into the Agentic AI Foundation, so both protocols in the standard agent stack now share a board, a roadmap and a trademark holder. What they still do not share is a delegation primitive — and the identity work that would supply one is being stewarded at a different foundation entirely.
You can look an MCP server up in four places and get four different kinds of answer: who owns the name, who will host it, who built the image, and what exists at all. Only one of them makes a claim about the artefact you are about to run — and none of them has read the tool descriptions, which is where an MCP server actually attacks you.
The 2026-07-28 MCP spec deleted the initialize handshake and the session-id header, so a server can now run behind a plain round-robin load balancer. That operational win is real — but statelessness is a transport property, not a system property. The session did not disappear; its bookkeeping moved onto every request, and the durability that long-running agents actually need came back in through the AWS-contributed Tasks extension as explicit handles. Read the two together before you celebrate a simpler protocol.
A2UI sends JSON and MCP Apps sends sandboxed HTML — the least consequential difference between them. One has the agent compose components you own, moving the review into your design system; the other installs an interface someone else wrote, moving it to the server boundary. Sort your surfaces by whether you can enumerate them, then pick.
Four platforms that stand between your agent and a user’s Gmail or Salesforce. The catalog sizes they advertise are counted in four different units and are the part you will outgrow; the token vault none of them market is the part you would hate to build. The decision you cannot retrofit is whose name is on the consent screen.
Five rival vendors agreed on a directory layout on 6 August, and explicitly declined to agree on install, distribution, permissions, sandboxing or provenance. The format makes one bundle of instructions plus credentialed tool access portable across six clients — which is exactly why the compensating controls are now yours.
Every identity vendor now sells “auth for AI agents”, and the phrase covers two opposite problems: letting an agent into your app, and letting your agent out to someone else’s API. Pick on direction first — and notice that a token vault holding a user’s full grant has relocated the credential rather than shrunk it.
The 28 July specification retires the initialize handshake and the Mcp-Session-Id header, and every write-up so far has framed that as plumbing. It is not. Dropping the held-open connection forced Sampling, Roots and Logging onto a twelve-month deprecation clock — and those were the features that made an MCP client a peer rather than a caller. The protocol just settled what it is.
When there is no API, an agent has to drive the browser itself — and four open-source projects disagree on how it should see the page. browser-use reads the DOM, Skyvern looks at pixels, Stagehand lets you dial between code and AI, and Playwright MCP is not an agent at all but the standard browser-tool layer any model can call. Picking one is really two decisions: Python or TypeScript, and a framework or an MCP server.
Two years from Anthropic's launch, MCP isn't a debate — it's a dependency. Every frontier vendor, every major IDE, and one Pinterest team saving 7,000 engineering hours a month all ship against it. The interesting question is no longer *should you use MCP* — it's what fails at this scale and how the 2026 roadmap plans to fix it.